



Manlius Pebble Hill Model United Nations

Conference October 2018

Disarmament and Security
Chairs:
Daniel Braverman
Katie Sullivan

Preface:

Delegates, welcome to the Disarmament and International Security committee at MPH MUN 2018. Your chairs for this conference will be Daniel Braverman and Katie Sullivan. Daniel is currently a junior at Manlius Pebble Hill, and Katie is currently a sophomore. This committee will be run resolution style. This means that all debated resolutions should be written, typed, and printed *before* the conference. Additionally, all three resolutions *must* be stapled together.

Delegates who wish to be considered for an award must hand in a position paper and resolutions for all three topics on conference day. If you have any questions, feel free to email us at anytime.

We look forward to a great conference!

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Introduction to Committee:

According to the United Nations, DISEC works on tackling “disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.” Since the creation of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) in 1962 by the General Assembly, DISEC has worked to prevent and resolve conflicts throughout the world. DISEC is the first committee in the United Nations General Assembly and arguably the most important, for it deals with complex issues regarding peace throughout the world.

Proliferation of Lethal Autonomous

Weapons in Conflict Zones

Introduction

Lethal autonomous weapons can be loosely defined as weapons which are lethal and can operate without a human needing to be present. This includes weapons that are controlled by a person at a different location. Some individual nations do have their own definition of what lethal autonomous weapons are. For example, the United States Department of Defense defines them as “a weapon system(s) that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” Lethal autonomous weapon systems have the potential to change warfare and conflicts immensely. Instead of sending troops in to fulfill a mission, a nation or group could send in a drone which can do the same mission and reduce the risk of fatalities. Clearly, the ability to accomplish the same

task while only risking a piece of technology as opposed to human lives is an attractive strategy in conflicts. Additionally, developments in technology have led to lethal autonomous weapons being able to accomplish much more while also being more discreet. Therefore, there has been a rise in the usage of lethal autonomous weapons in recent years and new lethal autonomous weapon technology is being developed at a rapid rate. Despite the militaristic advantages to using lethal autonomous weapons, there are still many who oppose the use of them. One of the biggest reasons for opposition to lethal autonomous weapons is that, in some instances, people don't like the idea of computers or artificial intelligence making decisions in life or death moments. The proliferation of lethal autonomous weapons is a dilemma that many nations will want to handle differently.

History

Beginning in the 1950s, rocket-powered target drones were developed to keep up with the speeds achieved by combat aircraft. In 1961, the Canberra U Mk 10 jet plane was used in Malta as a pilotless drone aircraft in the Seaslug guided missile trials. The following year, the SDI Drone became the first of a family of new drones to be acquired by the royal artillery to extend observation over the battlefield and to locate targets for new long range weapons. In the 1970s, drones became lighter and began to resemble the glider-like drones of today. Priority shifted from speed to weight and maneuverability, and drones were increasingly built of composite materials and piston engines. In 1972, the U.S. Air Force used laser-guided weapons to demolish the Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam, marking the first time a smart bomb successfully destroyed a major enemy

target. During the Vietnam War, the US Air Force also deployed autonomous unmanned surveillance aircraft that flew in circular patterns and shot film until their fuel ran out. In the 1990s, the technology for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), more commonly referred to as drones, became increasingly accessible, and more and more nations began to develop drones. The infamous Predator drone was created in 1994, and by 2001, it had been upgraded to carry Hellfire missiles. Thus, the era of lethal autonomous weapons was born.

Current Situation

The current situation regarding the proliferation of lethal autonomous weapons in conflict zones is a bit complicated, largely because of the many different factors to consider. First of all, despite the prevalence of lethal autonomous weapons, there still is not a widely accepted definition of what

lethal autonomous weapons are. Starting in 2014, the United Nations has held annual meetings regarding the proliferation and usage of lethal autonomous weapons, but definitions about lethal autonomous weapons have not yielded from the discussions. Without clear definitions, the push for banning lethal autonomous weapons has been difficult to do on an international scale. Therefore, the proliferation of lethal autonomous weapons and their use in conflict zones has continued.

A lack of clear definitions has not stopped many nations from explicitly endorsing a ban on all lethal autonomous systems. As of the last meeting regarding lethal autonomous weapons, attended by 82 nations from April 9th to April 13th, 2018, 26 of the nations in attendance were in support of a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. Just five nations, France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States, and Russia

were explicitly against negotiating a new international law regarding lethal autonomous weapons. One of the primary aspects regarding the use of any type of autonomous weapon is defining what it means for a weapon to be autonomous. Currently, nations still haven't come to a consensus about whether the definition for an autonomous weapon should include a weapon with human oversight or one that acts completely independent from human oversight and control. Any potential international laws, agreements, or United Nations resolutions would need to decide how to handle the differences in autonomy amongst weapons. Therefore, it has been difficult to come to an official resolution thus far, but progress has been made in the developments of nation's general views and opinions on lethal autonomous weapons even though the definitions are not clear.

The most commonly used type of lethal autonomous weaponry is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Due to technological advances, both the number of times drones are used in conflict zones and the effectiveness of the drones has increased in recent years. For example, in 2004, the United States, which utilizes drones more often than other nations, conducted less than five drone strikes. However, between 2009 and 2017, the United States launched 542 drone strikes between. The militaristic advantages of using drones and other lethal autonomous weapons, such as the ability to put fewer human lives at risk, has led to other nations following suit. However, many of the lethal autonomous weapons used by nations are not fully autonomous. The differences in autonomy amongst different weapon systems has made the classification of lethal autonomous weapons very difficult. Within DISEC, all the different types of

lethal autonomous weapons should be addressed, including weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

While the proliferation of lethal autonomous weapons has increased, there is a large opposition. As stated earlier, a large reason for the opposition is that people don't trust or want computers and artificial intelligence to make decisions which can be the difference between a person living or dying. This is an important aspect of lethal autonomous weapons in regard to civilian lives. People have many concerns over the risk that artificial intelligence or a computer in control of the weapon could mistakenly kill a large number of civilians or make an unethical decision. Additionally, if a war crime was committed by a lethal autonomous weapon, there is currently no way of holding someone or some people responsible for the crime. Lethal autonomous weapons are becoming both

more common and more dangerous, so it is important to address the issues regarding them adequately.

Questions to Consider:

1. How can lethal autonomous weapons and the autonomy of weapons be defined and categorized?
2. Should some or all forms of lethal autonomous weapons be banned? If so, which ones and why or why not?
3. Do the potential advantages of using lethal autonomous weapons in conflict zones outweigh the potential downsides?

Further Reading

1. An article discussing the ethics of using lethal autonomous weapons.
<https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/ethicsofweapons/>

2. An article about new drone technology and many NATO nations positions on the usage of lethal autonomous weapons.

<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/autonomous-military-drones-no-longer-science-fiction/EN/index.htm>

3. An article in which potential new autonomous weaponry is discussed and the advantages and disadvantages of using the weapons are weighed.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/do-killer-robots-violate-human-rights/390033/>

Conflict Strategies Towards Non-State

Actors

Introduction

Non-state actors, however beneficial they may be, are very controversial in their role during conflicts. A non-state actor is defined as, “an individual or organization that has significant political influence but is not allied to any particular country or state.” In the 21st century, non-state actors have gained more influence and relevance for a few reasons. First of all, the immense wealth of some people or companies has led to some being able to affect others with their money. Large donations to institutions or politicians can give these non-state actors large political influence. Another way that non-state actors have become more important in recent years is an increased amount of access to technology across the world. Lastly, the rise in both the number of terrorist organizations and the size of

terrorist organizations, which are non-state actors, gives them much more of an impact on people. Unlike other non-state actors, terrorist organizations often forcefully and militaristically impose their influence.

Non-state actors come in many different forms, ranging from either large charities, like the Gates Foundation, to terrorist organizations. Unsurprisingly, terrorist organizations are generally the non-state actors most involved in conflicts.

Considering that non-state actors are not representative of any particular country or state, their involvement in conflicts can be difficult for nations to handle. To handle conflicts involving non-state actors effectively, nations have to take many different aspects into account. For example, non-state actors have no defined geographic boundaries. Therefore, if a non-state actor is fighting in multiple nations, an outside nation might need to figure out how to deal

with the outsider, even if it isn't inside of the nation's border.

History

Issues with non-state actors committing transnational organized crimes, drug trafficking, and international terrorism have been prevalent since the 1950s' wave of ethnic nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments. Terrorist groups with nationalistic agendas began to form all over the world, such as the revitalized Irish Republican Army in 1969. This group was reignited in a quest by Irish Catholics to take back Northern Ireland from the British, and used tactics such as violent rioting, bombings, and assassinations to achieve their goals. In 1975, the Sri Lankan Liberation Tactics of Tamil Eelam, members of a Tamil minority, began using suicide bombings and other lethal tactics in order to wage a battle for independence against the

Sinhalese majority government. In the 1980s, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) began engaging in terrorist activities, such as kidnappings of foreign tourists in Turkey, suicide bombings, attacks on Turkish diplomatic offices in Europe, and repeatedly attacking civilians who refused to assist it. When the fighting peaked in the the mid-1990s, thousands of villages were destroyed in Southeastern Turkey, and an estimated 37,000 were killed in the the fighting. In 1970, organized crime groups such as Solntsevskaya Bratva, the Camorra, the 'Ndrangheta and the Sinaloa Cartel began transforming from domestic, regional, hierarchically structured crime groups to global and transnational criminal organizations. Until the 1970s, the 'Ndrangheta rarely operated outside Calabria. Yet, by the 1990s, the 'Ndrangheta was looking to global criminal markets for new opportunities, and began importing

cocaine for a growing European market. This shift turned organized crime to drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking, money-laundering, trafficking in firearms, counterfeit goods, wildlife and cultural property, and even some aspects of cybercrime.

Current Situation

Currently, the conflicts in which non-state actors play a large role involve terrorist organizations or gangs that are non-state actors. Unlike other non-state actors which often get their influence through wealth, the non-state actors that are most commonly involved in conflicts generally make their influences felt through militaristic force. With the influence of non-state actors involved in conflict increasing, handling these non-state actors and developing strategies to deal with them pose a great challenge to the international

community. To develop a great strategy toward non-state actors involved in conflict, nations and their delegates must understand the different conflicts currently occurring with non-state actors.

One of the worst current conflicts involving a non-state actor is the war in Afghanistan. The war has been raging for over sixteen years since the United States invaded, and there is no end date in sight. The United States' decision to invade a nation to go after the non-state actor al-Qaeda did lead to them completing their original goal to track down the leader of al-Qaeda: Osama bin Laden. However, a civil war also broke out in Afghanistan because the United States's invasion forced the group in control of the government to change. The Taliban, which was in control of Afghanistan at the time, lost its position of power to a western backed government. Therefore, the Taliban also became a

non-state actor. It is trying to gain back control of Afghanistan and the Afghan government, which has caused the conflict to drag on. The decision of the United States and its NATO allies to invade Afghanistan is one that is quite interesting in regard to dealing with non-state actors, especially since nowadays they are primarily fighting the Taliban.

Invading another nation to deal with non-state actors is a strategy that has both positives and negatives. The biggest and most obvious benefit is that the non-state actor is not able to avoid the consequences of its actions by hiding in a nation different than the one it has a conflict with. For example, the United States was still able to fight within the borders of Afghanistan, even if the Afghan government wasn't originally part of the purpose of the invasion. However, there have been many downsides, despite the fact that the original

mission was accomplished. First of all, as mentioned earlier, the conflict has dragged on for over sixteen years. This has led to increases in the death toll due to the conflict, the amount of money spent, and the number of troops deployed. Currently, there are roughly 15,000 NATO troops and 15,000 United States troops deployed in Afghanistan. While invading another nation is one strategy for dealing with conflicts involving non-state actors, it is not the only strategy employed by nations.

On the other side of the world of Afghanistan, Mexico takes a different approach to handling the conflicts involving non-state actors in its nation. Mexico doesn't have any major terrorist groups, but it does have organized drug cartels which cause serious violence and conflict. Since 2006, there have been an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 deaths in Mexico due to the organized criminal non-state actors. Unlike

the conflict in Afghanistan, the non-state actors in Mexico are being dealt with mainly by the Mexican government through two different approaches since the conflicts escalated in 2006. From 2006 to 2012, Mexico attempted to handle the drug cartels and organized criminal non-state actors by responding with militaristic force. This strategy was unsuccessful and led to even more deaths, especially of civilians. In 2012, the Mexican government decided to focus instead on improving its law enforcement agencies, which in turn led to a slight decrease in the homicide rates. However, the arrest and extradition of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the leader of the largest drug cartel in Mexico, led to an increase in drug related murders by twenty-two percent. Therefore, the work done by the Mexican government and its law enforcement made the situation worse in the short term due to many

different cartels trying to gain control at one time.

When deciding the best strategy to deal with non-state actors involved in conflict, nations need to consider many different aspects of the conflict as well as the resources that the nation has available. Additionally, the presence of the non-state actor which caused conflict in a different nation would also need to be managed. While it is theoretically possible for a nation to effectively make a strategy for engaging in a conflict with a non-state actor located in a different nation, it can be quite complicated. Cooperation and diplomacy between nations are necessities in successfully implementing a strategy toward managing conflicts with non-state actors.

Questions to Consider:

1. How can a nation or nations have effective diplomatic talks with a

non-state actor in regard to a conflict?

2. What is the best strategy for managing a conflict with a non-state actor located in a different nation?
3. Should conflicts with non-state actors be conducted differently than conflicts with nations?

3. Information about non-state actors working peacefully with a body of the United Nations.

<http://www.who.int/about/collaborations/non-state-actors/in-official-relations/en/>

Further Readings

1. An article about working with non-state actors toward peace.

<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-883-schneckener.pdf>

2. More information about the Afghanistan War and the strategies toward non-state actors employed.

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War>

Drug Cartels in Southeast Asia

Introduction

Since the 1950s, the infamous Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia has been one of the world's primary producers of opium. A region overlapping the rural mountains of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, the Golden Triangle continues to be a hub for the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics, including heroin, as well as methamphetamine. These hard drugs bring in an estimated \$1-2 billion each year for Myanmar, making them Myanmar's second largest export, behind petroleum. The poorly patrolled mountainous region is largely governed by armed rebel groups, and various strategies have yet to succeed in shutting down farmers and traffickers. The illegal drug trade has become a lifeline for resistance movements and terrorist organizations from Southeast Asia to the Greater Middle East. The illicit markets

within these nations have prolonged conflict and fueled instability. In Myanmar, minority-led nationalist and secessionist resistance movements, termed "ethnic armed groups," profit from the Golden Triangle. But efforts to steer farmers towards legal crops, such as by locating and destroying illegal crops,, often forces rural peoples into poverty or drives villagers to new, more remote areas ripe for opium production.

History

Southeast Asia, similarly to most other major regions throughout the world, has been plagued by drugs and drug cartels for a long period of time. Ever since Great Britain started illegally exporting it in the nineteenth century to Southeast Asia, mainly China, opium has been the most commonly produced and consumed drug in the region. China received thousands and thousands of tons of opium and many people became

addicted to the drug. The illegal importation of the drug into China became such an issue that two wars, the Opium Wars, broke out between the British and Chinese in the mid-nineteenth century. Despite the wars, the Southeast Asian region quickly became a leader in the opium production industry.

Opium is a drug that comes from the opium poppy plant which was growing in abundance in areas of Southeast Asia. Most commonly, the drug cartels in Southeast Asia that have produced it have also refined it into heroine to sell on markets all around the world. In the twentieth century, Southeast Asia was the global leader in opium production. For example, in the 1970s, over seventy percent of the worldwide production of opium was done by three small nations in Southeast Asia: Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. Considering the immense control that nations in Southeast Asia had over the global opium production

market, it is not a surprise that many drug cartels led by powerful drug lords such as Wei Hsueh-kang arose and became powerful.

Unlike in Latin America, the drug cartels in Southeast Asia at the time were not very large nor extremely violent. Instead, the drug cartels focused on controlling and maximizing their ability to trade and sell the drugs. This led to the creation of the infamous Southeast Asian drug trade route still used by cartels today, known as the Golden Triangle. It connected the three places of Southeast Asia which were, in the twentieth century, the largest opium producing places in the world. Therefore, drug cartels had immense influence and control over opium production and its sales. Over time, these cartels have begun to account for less of the opium production throughout the world, but they are still powerful and dangerous.

Current Situation

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have seen remarkable increases in GDP (gross domestic product). This is largely a result of regional agreements which encourage the freer movement of goods, people, and capital, and in turn the trade that led to overall economic growth. But transnational organized crime groups such as the Hawngleuk Militia and the Laotian drug cartels have seized upon this opportunity to develop their presence in Southeastern Asia and traffic and smuggle drugs, goods, etc.

Additionally, new psychoactive substances (NPS) have been created and produced, with 168 new drugs detected since 2008 across 11 Southeastern Asian nations and China. Though heroin and meth remain the main products for the region's narco-gangs, new substances are emerging increasingly, with just three hitting the

streets in 2008 compared to 80 in 2016. Not only that, but because cocaine use is rising among China's wealthy party-goers, transshipment hubs from Latin America have been taking advantage of the soft security at the region's ports.

The UN and China have introduced crop substitution as a solution in Myanmar and Laos, but this often fails its implementation because it overlooks the needs of mountainous agriculture and falls short on its long term commitment. In 2007, for example, China's crop substitution programs seemed successful at reducing opium production. Unfortunately, poor investment in infrastructure and little commitment to technical assistance established a situation in which alternative cash crops could not compete on a global market, leaving upland farmers stranded and helpless. Because more profitable crops require longer periods of growing and food

prices are falling while transportation costs are on the up and up, alternative investment is highly discouraging and has so far been unsuccessful. Even hired agricultural labor forces are drawn towards illicit crops because of the great difference in pay. Hired labor on an illegal opium farm in Kachin state of Myanmar will earn \$8 an hour compared with \$2.5 an hour working on a legal farm.

Narcotic production did drop off in 2007 due to the involvement of US authorities and China, which put economic pressure on the region. However, production has since picked back up and is ever increasing. Governments have deployed their own militaries to combat opium production and trafficking, but state-backed militia members often traffick drugs themselves, and enjoy legal immunity from prosecution. Although the government efforts to combat illegal drug production and

trafficking persist, corruption and the involvement of both civilian and military officials in the narcotics business have weakened the perpetual success of drug control policies after 2007.

Questions to Consider:

1. Should prevention of the creation of new illicit drugs take precedence over the curtailment of familiar illicit drug production?
2. How responsive is the use of illicit drugs to changes in policy towards other illicit drugs?
3. Would the legalization of these illicit drugs reduce demand or contribute to the problem?

Further Reading

1. An article that looks at the effectiveness of current tactics towards addressing illicit drug

trafficking and production.

<https://newnaratif.com/journalism/the-war-on-drugs-in-southeast-asia/>

2. An article which considers the effects of the expansion of Latin American cartels into Southeastern Asia.

<http://sea-globe.com/mexican-drug-cartels-southeast-asia/>

3. An article that examines the ramifications of targeting visible pawns in cartel hierarchies rather than kingpins.

<http://www.atimes.com/article/target-golden-triangle-drug-lords-not-users-un-urges/>